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This paper estimates “haircuts”—realized investor losses—in recent debt restructurings in 
Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. Haircuts are computed as the 
percentage difference between the present values of old and new instruments, discounted at 
the yield prevailing immediately after the exchange. We find substantial differences between 
average haircuts ranging from 10-15 percent (Uruguay) to more than 70% in the case of the 
Argentina domestic exchanges. Some (but not all) exchanges exhibit substantial variations in 
haircuts even within the exchange, depending on the instrument tendered. Thus, 
“intercreditor equity” was often violated ex post, at least in a present value sense. When 
domestic and foreign residents could be identified we find that exchanges have tended to be 
milder on domestic bondholders.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper estimates investor losses—or “haircuts,” in market parlance—associated with the 
new generation of sovereign debt restructurings that started with Russia’s 1998 default and 
has since extended to a number of emerging market countries in Eastern European, the 
Middle East, and Latin America. Specifically, we examine the December 1999 exchange of 
Pakistani Eurobonds, the 1999 “Novation” exchange of Russian domestic debt, a string of 
restructurings in Ukraine during 1998 and 1999, the 2000 external debt exchanges in Russia, 
Ukraine and Ecuador, the November 2001 “Phase 1” exchange of Argentine bonds, the 2002 
“Pesification” of Argentine debt, and the May 2003 Uruguayan bond exchange.  
 
One motivation for the empirical exercise conducted in this paper is simply to better 
understand emerging market debt as an asset class. A key question in this regard is how 
much investors typically recover in a default situation, and whether there are substantial 
variations from one debt restructuring to another. It is also interesting whether investors were 
treated equally within each debt restructuring, or whether some instrument holders came out 
better than others, and if so, whether there is a systematic relationship with the characteristics 
of the initial instrument or the residence of the bondholder. 
 
A second motivation is related to economic policy. Some of the debt restructurings that we 
consider in this paper, such as Pakistan’s 1999 Eurobond restructuring, were based on a 
deliberate decision by official creditors to force private creditors to take some losses in order 
to reduce the moral hazard associated with official debt forgiveness. The question is whether 
they succeeded, and how big those losses turned out to be ex post. However, policy makers 
in international institutions and creditor countries are also interested in the continued 
existence of a sovereign debt market, and concerned about debtor moral hazard. In particular, 
they would like distressed debtors to “act in good faith” in restructuring their debts, avoiding 
restructuring proposals that fall below commonly accepted standards of what defines a 
reasonable offer. But what is normal or reasonable in this context? To answer this question, it 
is necessary to know something about the magnitude of investor losses in past restructurings.   
 
Though this is the first paper, to our knowledge, to systematically compute “haircuts” for a 
range of debt restructurings with a common methodology, there has been important related 
work. First, there is a literature on “private sector involvement” in the recent debt crises, 
including Eichengreen and Rühl (2000), Lipworth and Nystedt (2001),  IMF (2001), World 
Bank (2002), and Cline (2004) that discusses the terms of recent debt restructurings and 
describes reductions in face value as well as the market performance of bonds before and 
after specific events. Unlike this study, however, these papers do not estimate net present 
value losses suffered by investors. Second, there are some papers on average returns to 
emerging market debt, most recently Klingen, Weder and Zettelmeyer (2004), who estimate 
returns to emerging market debt since 1970 and for shorter subperiods for a variety of 
emerging market countries. However, their sample ends in 2000 and excludes the transition 
economies; thus, they miss most of the debt crises studied in this paper. Moreover, their 
results are based on annual data, which does not allow the computation of losses associated   - 3 - 
 
 
with specific debt restructuring events. Third, investment banks and creditor organizations, as 
well as the International Monetary Fund, have in some cases estimated the “haircuts” 
associated with some specific crises. However, these estimates are generally not published, 




The methodology adopted in this paper is to compute investor losses in this paper as the 
difference between the net present value of the original and the new (restructured) 
instruments, using the immediate post-exchange (“exit”) yield of the new instrument to 
discount both payments streams. Thus, these are the realized, ex post losses of investors in 
the immediate aftermath of a restructuring.  In the section that follows, we justify this 
measure of investor losses in some detail. 
 
Our main results are as follows. First, there are substantial differences between the average 
haircuts in the exchanges, ranging from haircuts in the order of 10 percent to more than 70 
percent. Second, some (but not all) exchanges exhibit substantial variations in the haircut 
even within the same exchange, depending on the instrument tendered. Thus, in most cases, 
“intercreditor equity” was violated ex post, at least in a present value sense.  Finally, we find 
that when it was possible to distinguish between local and foreign bondholders, the former 
were usually offered more favorable terms. We explore some regularities in within-exchange 
variations in investor losses, and some conjectures of what might be driving them.  
 
II.   MEASURING INVESTOR LOSSES 
Economists and market participants would generally agree that the losses suffered by 
investors in a debt exchange should be measured by comparing the net present value of cash 
flows promised under the old and new debt instruments. The question is whether these cash 
flows should be discounted using a common interest rate or different interest rates, and what 
discount rates should be used.  
 
For example, an investor holding an instrument since the time of its emission or purchase 
may feel that he loses to the extent that the market value of the new debt instrument is lower 
than the market value of the old instrument at the time of its purchase; in effect comparing 
the NPV of the original instrument discounted with pre-crisis yields to the NPV of the new 
instrument discounted with the “exit yield” prevailing after the exchange. For our purposes, 
however, this definition of investor losses is too broad, since it includes any loss attributable 
to the deterioration of economic fundamentals prior to the crisis, rather than the loss 
attributable to the terms of the exchange. At the other extreme, it is unhelpful to compare the 
market value of the old instrument just prior to the exchange with the market value of the 
new instrument just after the exchange, since, in a world of perfect foresight, these should be 
                                                 
2 For an exception, see the IMF’s published report on the Uruguay debt exchange; this includes some estimates 
of NPV losses for investors (IMF, 2003, Appendix II, p. 49).    - 4 - 
 
 
equal. Any measured gain or loss will thus reflect the extent to which the result of the 
exchange was incorrectly anticipated, independently of the terms of the exchange.  
 
Like most authors, we thus take the view that the cash flows promised under the new and old 
instruments must be compared using the same discount rate (except for adjustments 
reflecting differences in maturities, as explained below). From the perspective of measuring 
realized losses the appropriate discount rate is the yield implicit in the market value of the 
new instrument immediately after the close of the exchange: this will reflect the results of the 
exchange (i.e., the participation rate) but not news about economic fundamentals that 
becomes available after the exchange, i.e. after the results of the exchange are known. Thus, 
our approach is to compare the market value of the new instruments, plus any cash payment 
received, with the NPV of the payments remaining on the old instruments, discounted using 
the yield of the new instruments (r): 
 
  (, ) ( , ) H NPV old r NPV new r ≡ − . (1) 
 
One nice property of a haircut in this particular definition is as a measure of the “coercion”, 
or pressure, that must have been exerted on investors in order to solve the free rider problem 
associated with a particular exchange. To see this, let  { } (|) ij ji u accept a
≠  denote the expected 
payoff from accepting the exchange offer, conditioning on the actions of other investors (i.e. 
accept or reject), and  { } (| ) ij ji u reject a
≠  the expected payoff from holding on to the old debt 
instrument. To the extent that the exchange was successful, it must have been true that for the 
investors that accepted the exchange offer,    
 
  { } { } (|) ( |) 0 ij i j ji ji u accept a u reject a
≠≠ − ≥ , (2) 
 
 
{ } (|) ij ji u accept a
≠  is just the market value of the new instrument, that is, the price that can 
be observed in the secondary market after the exchange. By definition this is equal to the net 
present value of the cash flow promised by the new instrument, discounted by the secondary 
market yield of these new instruments. Thus,  { } (|) ( , ) ij ji u accept a NPV new r
≠ = .  Using (1) 
and (2), one obtains: 
 
  { } (, ) ( | ) ij ji H NPV old r u reject a
≠ ≤− , (3) 
 
{ } (| ) ij ji u reject a
≠  is the (unobservable) utility, or value, of holding on to the old instrument, 
conditioning on the outcome of the exchange, given expectations about what would happen 
to old instruments that were not traded in.  (, ) NPV old r  is the net present value of the cash 
flow associated with the old instrument discounted at the yield of the new instrument—that   - 5 - 
 
 
is, assuming “equal treatment”, or no discrimination. In actual fact, of course, there was 
discrimination, in the sense of an open or implicit threat that the old instruments would not 
be serviced in the same way as the new ones, so  { } (, ) ( | ) ij ji NPV old r u reject a
≠ −  was 
typically greater than zero. The haircut, H, tells us how big the difference between the 
theoretical value of the old instrument,  (, ) NPV old r , and its value as it was actually 
perceived must have been, at a minimum, to make the exchange work (in the sense that 
equation (2) was satisfied), given the quality of the exchange offer  (, ) NPV new r . In this 
sense, H measures the (minimum) “coerciveness” of an exchange.  
 
While conceptually simple, measuring H as defined in (1) involves a number of practical 
complications.  The most important of these is that the maturities of the new and old 
instruments will typically not be the same. Suppose, as will generally be the case, that the 
maturity of the new instrument is longer than that of the old instrument, and that the term 
structure is upward sloping. Then the yield of this new instrument will be higher than that of 
a new instrument with the length of the old instrument. By discounting the old instrument 
with this higher yield, we will tend to underestimate the NPV that we would have obtained 
by discounting with a yield corresponding to the maturity of the old instruments, and 
consequently the extent of the haircut.  
 
To deal with this problem, we attempt to estimate the “new” yield corresponding to the 
average length of the old instrument by interpolating the yields on new instruments (there are 
usually more than one) accordingly. When this is not possible—as it may be if all new 
instruments are longer than the old one in terms of remaining maturity— [or when the yield 
curve does not have any discernible pattern] we use the yield on the new instrument that is 
closest to the old bond in terms of average length, and make an adjustment using the yield 
curve on US treasury bills.  
 
A second complication is that by applying the new instrument yield to the old instrument we 
are also assuming that both instruments were of the same seniority. However, in some 
cases—for example the Russian exchange in which new instruments were upgraded to debt 
of the Russian Federation as opposed to debt owed by a state-owned bank—the sovereign 
resorted to security enhancements to make new instruments more attractive. By discounting 
the old instrument’s cash flow with the yield of the new instruments we would be incorrectly 
applying this enhancement to the old instrument. In this case, we may be overestimating the 
haircut with respect to the true old instruments. 
 
A third complication relates to the treatment of unpaid interest. We treat unpaid interest on 
the old bonds as part of the outstanding claim, but generally ignore interest on interest.  The 
main exception is the Russian exchange, in which cash payments associated with past due 
interest were spread out over a long time period; in this case, we compute the value of PDI as 
a net present value. 
 
A fourth complication arises when the exchange involves a change in the currency of 
denomination of the two instruments. In this case old and new instruments cannot be   - 6 - 
 
 
discounted at the same rate. Fortunately, in most cases there are both foreign and domestic 
currency exit yields, so it just a matter of applying the discount factor of the relevant 
currency in each case, adjusted by maturity when necessary. 
 
A fifth complication arises from the lack of information. In several instances the package 
received by the bondholders contained a combination of new bonds, but there is little 
precision as to how much bond of each was exchanged for each particular instrument. In 
general, when facing such lack of information we compute two bounds. In one the 
bondholder receives the best possible instrument. In the other, she receives the worst. In 
general (but not always), these alternatives do not generate substantially different results.    
 
Finally, in some instances—the Ukraine exchanges in 1998 and the November 2001 
Argentine exchange—the new instrument was not immediately traded, and thus there is no 
“exit yield” for these bonds. In the case of Ukraine we obtain exit yields from the market 
returns on similar instruments issued immediately after the exchange. In the case of 
Argentina, old bonds continued to be traded after the exchange, and the new instruments 
were eventually traded, albeit after a substantial time lag. As explained in more detail below, 
the implicit yields of these two groups of bonds are used to compute upper and lower bound 
estimates for the true haircut. Fortunately, they are sufficiently close to be informative. 
 
Given the complexities of the computation it is not surprising that this exercise has not been 
tackled yet. We believe that the contribution of this paper lies in resolving these complexities 
in a consistent fashion and obtaining comparable numbers among the different exchanges.  
 
III.   RESULTS 
A.   Russia
3 
Russia’s devaluation on August 18, 1998 led to a default on its domestically issued debt, 
while the government tried to stay current on its external obligations. On August 25 the 
government made a first restructuring offer on its Ruble denominated “GKO” treasury bills, 
which was rejected by market participants. In March of 1999, the government finalized a 
restructuring agreement, known as  “novation”, with holders of GKOs and longer term Ruble 
denominated OFZs, which had rejected the government’s August 1998 exchange offer.  
 
Under the novation scheme, holders of GKO or OFZs would accept to have their scheduled 
payment discounted to August 19, 1998, at a rate of 50 percent per annum. Subsequently, 
they would received a package including a combination of cash and very short term 
instruments in addition to longer term OFZs. The short term component included a cash 
payment equivalent to 3.33% of the adjusted nominal value, 3.33% in 3-month GKOs (these 
                                                 
3 This material has in part been reconstructed with information from NUPI, Center for Russian Studies. For a 
complete review of the events leading to the Russian crisis see Kharas et al (2001), and for a comprehensive 
description of the Russian debt restructuring is provided by Santos (2003). See also JP Morgan (1997, 2000).   - 7 - 
 
 
bonds had an issue date of December 15 so that they would expire shortly after the exchange 
on the 24
th of March), 3.33% in a 6-month GKOs (also with an issue date on December 15), 
and “cash value” OFZ for 20 percent  of nominal value that could be used at par to pay tax 
obligations that were in arrears as of July 1st, 1998, or to purchase newly issued shares of 
Russian banks. The remaining 70% was returned in OFZs with maturities ranging from 4 to 5 
years with coupons of 30, 25, 20, 15 and 10 each year, respectively. With the exception of 
cash, any receipts from selling these OFZs had to be deposited in restricted ruble accounts 
that could be used to purchase selected Russian corporate bonds and equity securities.
4 
 
Table 1 shows the results for the GKO exchange. For brevity we only show the first GKO 
maturing in each of the months for which there were GKO instruments restructured.
5  The 
upper half of the table shows the present value at the time of the exchange of GKOs with a 
face value of 100 rubles. The exit yield on GKOs was used to discount GKOs payments 
maturing after March 1999 to the time of the exchange. The average ruble deposit rate in the 




The lower half of the table shows what investors received in return, both in “cash items” and 
in longer term OFZs with all flows discounted at 25.3%, the average yield of GKOs during 
March 1999. Recall that the values are computed taking into account that the original flow 
had been discounted at a 50% nominal interest rate back to August (line “recognized value of 
old instrument”). Thus, if an instrument had a face value recognition of 90% (see first 
column) the 3.33% of cash implies a payment of 3.33*0.9=3 per 100 of face value, and so on 
with the other instruments. 
 
As there is little information as to the exact number of OFZs given to each GKO holder, we 
compute two bounds. One (lower) bound considers that the holder received only the shorter 
of the OFZs, thus providing the most convenient alternative to bond holders. The other 
(upper) bound considers that the bond holders only obtained the longest version.   
Fortunately, the difference between the two bounds is minimal so the computation is 
meaningful.  
 
                                                 
4 Nonresidents electing to convert and repatriate restricted rubles had available an alternative but it entailed 
additional losses.  
5 The complete table for all GKOs bonds identified by Bloomberg as defaulted can be found in 
www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen.  
6 Both rates were obtained from the Rusian Central Bank, at www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/. This page provide 
monthly average yields of financial institutions and for GKO bonds with maturities up to 90 days.    - 8 - 
 
 
Finally, the haircuts are computed, in percentage terms, by subtracting the total value 
obtained from the present value of the old claim and dividing by the latter. The numbers 
indicate that investors lost between 13% and 24% of the pre-existing claim.
78 
 
Russian institutional holders, which were required to hold GKO/OFZs by law, received 
slightly different terms (10 percent cash, 10 percent in 3 month GKOs, 10 percent in 6 month 
GKOs, 20 percent in cash value OFZs and 50 percent in OFZs with maturities ranging from 4 
to 5 years).
9 While the larger share of cash payments may seem to indicate a better deal, the 
fact that the coupon rate offered on OFZs was larger than the market discount rate, implies 
that the PV of the new claims decreased when the cash items increased. The final two lines 
of Table 1 show the corresponding haircuts. The differences with the previous case, are, in 
any case, very small.  
 
The banking crisis that followed the devaluation-default decision eventually had implications 
for Russian external debt payments. On December 2 of 1998, the state-owned 
Vneshekonombank missed a 362 million payment on its “PRINs”, and on June 2, 1999, it 
missed a payment on its “IANs”. “PRINs” and “IANs” were dollar denominated, floating 
interest, long term bonds with total face value of US$ 29 billion that had been issued in 1997 
following an agreement with the London Club to restructure Soviet era debt owed to Western 
commercial banks. Though widely considered as part of Russia’s external public debt, they 
were technically obligations of Vneshekonombank rather than obligations of the Russian 
Federation. In addition, Russia had issued several Eurobonds between 1996 and 1998, on 
which it did not default. 
 
In May 1999, the Russian government also defaulted on Soviet era MinFin 3. However, in 
January 2000 it offered to exchange the bonds for one of two alternatives. Either a new eight-
year bond similar to the original instrument, i.e. in US dollars and with a coupon of 3%, or a 
four year OFZ (ruble denominated bond) paying an interest rate of 15% for the first year and 
10% thereafter, with interest paid semiannually and bullet principal payment. Table 2 shows 
the haircuts involved in the MinFin 3 restructuring. Grossing up the missed principal 
payment by the US treasury bill,
10 was worth 106.2 on February 2
nd of 2000. The new eight-
                                                 
7 It is plausible but wrong to think that the low haircut is the result that the computation is done in rubles, 
unattentive to the fact that the exchange rate was devaluing very quickly. At the time of the exchange, expected 
depreciation of the local currency is embedded in the interest rates, if this expectation is very high so will 
interest rates, and therefore higher will be the PV loss from maturity extensions and low interest rates.  
8 It may be worth noticing that we are ignoring the restrictions imposed by the fact that amounts had to be 
placed in restricted rouble accounts. Thus these haircut computations correspond to those faced by an investor 
that would not exit the Russian market immediately.   
9 Some investors that refused to take the “novation” offer were paid according to the original (ruble) terms; 
however, non-residents were not allowed to repatriate their funds for a period of 5 years. 
10 This is equivalent to assuming that the bondholders had taken their money out of Russia and into a safe 
option after the MinFin3 had come due.   - 9 - 
 
 
year bond, discounted at the exit yield of the new bond of 17.5%,
11 delivers a PV of 45.6 
implying a haircut of 57%. The OFZ alternative, discounted at the only slightly higher ruble 
rate of 20% gives a PV of 76 and a haircut of only 28.3%. While the haircut computation 
delivers a smaller value for the conversion to a ruble instrument, it is reported (and this is 
confirmed by the amounts issued) that most investors opted for the first alternative.
12  
 
Shortly after the MinFin3 restructuring proposal, on February 11, 2000 Russia offered to 
exchange both Vnesh’s PRINs and IANs for two new Eurobonds of the Russian Federation. 
The deal was closed in August 2000, restructuring all PRINs and IANs with a total of 21 
billion of new instruments issued in exchange for an original nominal value of 31.8 billion 
(the original face value of $29 billion, plus past due interest amounting to US$ 2.8 billion).  
 
In exchange for IANs, PRINs, bondholders were offered a 2030 Eurobond with a step up 
(2.25 to 7.5 percent) coupon, after a face value reduction of 37.5 percent for the longer 
maturity PRINs and 33 percent for the shorter maturity IANs.  Past due interest was 
compensated (without face value reduction) by a 2010 Eurobond with a fixed 8.25 percent 
coupon, and a small cash “sweetener”. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the Russian PRIN,and IAN exchange. The upper half of the table shows 
the terms and present values of 100 units of PRINs and IANs, respectively, at the time of the 
exchange,
13 as well as the associated past due interest accumulated between December of 
1998 and February of 2000. As explained in the last section, the present values are computed 
using the yield curve of Russian debt adjusted for the shorter maturities of the PRINs and 
IANs. The adjustment is easy in this case since a range of undefaulted Russian Eurobonds 
were trading in the secondary markets at the time, whose yields can be used to interpolate. 
Since the Russian Eurobond yield curve was quite flat, it makes very little difference.  
 
                                                 
11 Corresponding to its first day of trading, the 29
th of June of 2000. 
12 A possible may be found in that while the bonds that replaced the MinFin 3 were issued February 1
st 2000, 
the option to exchange the MinFin 3 was open ended. Thus for bond holders trading in later than this date the 
haircut computation may be slightly different. By year end most bondholders had traded in their original 
holdings.  
13 For most instruments that are examined in this paper, if an investor had bought and held 100 units of principal 
since the time of issue, the face value of his or her claim at the time of the debt exchange would also be 100 
units. However, there are two exceptions: first, amortizing bonds, that were in part repaid before the debt 
exchange, and bonds with capitalized interest payments, whose face value increased before the debt exchange. 
In these cases, the computations in the tables (PVs of the old instruments values obtained in the form of new 
instruments) refer to 100 units of principal at the time of the exchange, rather than at the time of issue. For 
example, the interest paid on Russian PRINs prior to the December 1998 default was in part capitalized into 
IANs, so that an investor owning 100 PRINs at the time of issue would have owned a basket of 100 PRINs and 
about 3.6 IANs at the time of the debt exchange. However, the computations in the left column of table 1 refer 
to 100 units of PRINs only, not to the PRIN/IAN basket associated with 100 units of PRINs at issue.   - 10 - 
 
 
The lower half of the table shows what investors received in return: a small cash payment for 
PDI, some amount of the 2010 Eurobond for PDI, and the 2030 Eurobond in exchange for 
the original instrument, after a face value reduction. The lines “value obtained (per 100 units 
of principal)” are computed by subtracting the corresponding face value reduction (if any) 
from 100 units of the old bond and then multiplying with the price of one new bond. For 
example, in the “PRINs” column, (100 – 37.5)*0.418 = 26.1. Finally, the haircuts are 
computed, in percentage terms, by subtracting the total value obtained from the present value 
of the old claim (including PDI) and dividing by the latter. The main result is that investors 
lost about 50 percent of the pre-exchange claim. Percentage losses on the shorter IANs were 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































One caveat applies, namely that the new instruments had two features that were designed to 
upgrade their seniority relative to the old instruments. First, there was an upgrade in the 
obligor, which became the Russian federation rather than Vneshekonombank. Second, it 
included expanded cross acceleration clauses linking default on the 2010 and 2030 bonds to 
any other issues of Russian Federation Eurobonds (including new issues), and vice versa. 
MinFins as domestic debt remained subordinated, in the sense that—though dollar 
denominated—they were not legally linked to existing Russian Federation Eurobonds. Since 







Amount issued (US$ mn) 1,307
Amount outstanding (US$ mn) 1,307
Maturity date 05/29/99
Coupon (percent) 3
Average remaining life (years) Matured
Compound rate used (yield, in percent) 1/ 4.8
Present value on 3/1 (per 100 principal) 106.2
New Instruments
Option 1: New 7 years, 3% coupon MinFin
Maturity 11/14/07
Present value (1) on Nov. 7 (UB) 45.6
Discount rate used (yield, in percent) 17.5%
Option 2: New 3 years, 15%-10% coupon rouble denominated OFZ
Maturity 11/19/03
Exchange Coefficient (RUBs per dollar) 26.2
Present value (1) on Nov. 7 (UB) 76.1
Discount rate used (yield, in percent) 20.0%
Haircut based on Option 1 57.1%
Haircut based on Option 2 28.3%
1/ 3 months' USA T-Bill yield used to compound the corresponding dollar cash flow
Table 2. Russian MinFin Exchange

















































Characteristics of Old Instruments
Amount outstanding (US$ mn) 22,231                  6,841                    
Maturity date 12/15/2020 12/15/2015
Average life  (years) 1/ 10.92 9.05
Coupon (percent) libor + 13/16 libor + 13/16
Present value of cash flow on August 23 (PV1, per 100 of principal) 56.5 60.8
Discount rate used (in percent) 2/ 16.6% 16.6%
Present value of cash flow on August 23 (PV2, per 100 of principal) 57.2 62.0
Discount rate used (in percent) 3/ 16.4% 16.2%
Past due interest on August 23 (PDI, per 100 of principal, face value) 10.3 8.3
Present value of PDI as of August 23 (per 100 of principal) 9.1 8.6
Present value (1) of cash flow including PDI 65.6 69.4
Present value (2) of cash flow including PDI 66.2 70.6
New Instruments and Cash obtained
Cash payment
Per $100 of PDI 9.5 9.5
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 1.0 0.8
2010 percent Eurobond with 8.25 percent coupon (for PDI)
Amount issued (US$ mn) 2066.2 515.0
Price on issue date 71.1 71.1
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 6.6 5.3
Total Compensation for PDI (per 100 of principal) 7.6 6.1
2030 Eurobond with 2.25 - 7.5 percent step-up coupon (for principal)
Amount issued (US$ mn) 13,894                  4,584                    
Price on issue date 41.8 41.8
Face value reduction (per 100 of principal) 37.5 33.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 26.1 28.0
Total value obtained 33.7 34.1
Haircut based on PV1 48.7% 50.8%
Haircut based on PV2 49.2% 51.7%
1/ Weighted average of time of amortization, using percent amortization in each time period as weights.
2/ Yield to maturity on new 2030 Eurobond yield on August 25, 2000
3/ Yield corresponding to mean repayment period, using linear interpolation of outstanding Eurobond yields.
4/ For PRINs, PV of PDI is smaller than nominal PDI because some of the PDI took the form of capitalized interest, i.e. a 
claim on a future payment stream rather than a past cash payment.
Table 3. Russian PRINs and IANs Exchange
(February 11-August 23, 2000)  - 15 - 
 
 
B.   Ukraine
14 
Ukraine started having problems in keeping to date with its debt shortly after the Russian 
crisis had dried up the market for Ukranian issues. By August 1998 the Ukranian government 
had already negotiated “quasi voluntary” debt exchanges with three groups of creditors: 
domestic commercial banks who were holders of treasury bills (OVDPs), non-resident 
holders of treasury bills, and holders of a loan placed through Chase Manhattan in October of 
1997.  
 
A conversion scheme for treasury bills owned by domestic banks was announced on August 
26. It offered to exchange T-bills into longer term hryvnia denominated bonds of 3 to 6 years 
maturity. The interest rate on the new bonds was set at 40 percent for the first year, and a 
floating coupon equal to the future 6-month T-bill yield plus 1 percentage point for the 
remainder of the period. According to the IMF 
15 commercial banks eventually agreed to 
exchange about hryvnia 800 million, or about one third of their portfolio.  
 
Table 4 shows the haircuts involved for a typical outstanding treasury bills held by a 
domestic holder at the time of the exchange. This entails no loss of generality as the 
mechanics of the exchange implied that all OVDP holders suffered a similar haircut. Thus 
the haircut presented is identical to that suffered by holders of other OVDPs.  The payments 
due under the old instrument were discounted at the running Treasury bill rate. This curve 
remained surprisingly constant throughout the exchange so it makes virtually no difference 
whether we use the curve corresponding to a few days earlier or a few days after the 
exchange.
16 This yield curve delivers a downward curve starting at 72% for short-term 
instruments, going down to 55% at slightly more than one year maturity. 
  The discounted 
value determines the number of new, coupon-bearing bonds obtained by bondholders.
17 As it 
is unclear how many of each type of new bonds was obtained by each bondholder, we 
compute two extreme alternatives. In one, bondholders had their holdings transformed fully 
into the shortest bond (3 year maturity), in the other everything was transformed into the 
                                                 
14 For a description of this case see also Eichengreen and Rühl (2000) and Lipworth and Nystedt (2001). This 
material has in part been reconstructed with information from the Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice 
Centre (UEPLAC). 
15 (Country Report 99/42, p. 43) 
16 We use new issues because the instruments issued in the exchange did not trade for quite some time after the 
exchange. 
17 An independent source confirms the exchange ratio assumed in the table. According to Ukraine Today, 31
st 
August 1998, “Only OVDPs with the term of maturity on August 27, 1998 will be exchange for conversion 
bonds in full. The exchange of September bonds will be done on a 98.89/96.72% basis, of October bonds at 
95.04-93.34% basis, November bonds at 91.6-96.72% basis. The value of July 24-August 27, 1999 maturity 
OVDP papers is to be estimated at 65.57% of their nominal value”. Notice that the value of the 1999 
corresponds roughly with the one assumed by us, as resulting from discounting the flows at the exit yield.      - 16 - 
 
 
longest maturity (6 years). The cash flows corresponding to these new bonds are also 
discounted by the yield curve computed from new issues in the immediate aftermath of the 
exchange.
18 The comparison of both values delivers very similar results, which, in addition, 
confirm that the haircut was relatively small (between 7.35% and 7.75%) and equal for all 
instruments. This is consistent with the presumption that the Ukraine government, at the 
time, was not attempting to haircut investors but just to extend maturities.  
 
Foreign bondholders faced a similar conversion but with different terms. All holders were 
given the chance to exchange their holdings for an hryvnia denominated bond with a 22 
percent hedged annual yield, but the market largely ignored this option. Some holders that 
had purchased currency hedges were given a special deal, but the lack of information as to 
the terms of these hedges does not allow computing the corresponding losses. T-bill holders 
without currency hedges received a 2 year zero-coupon dollar-denominated Eurobond with a 
yield of 20%. It is only this option, from the three available, that we estimate. 
 
Investors eventually agreed to exchange about 83 percent of the eligible amount of 1.41 
billion hyrvnias. Table 4 shows the results, which turned out quite different than for domestic 
holders. The value of the OVDPs was transformed into dollars at the prevailing exchange 
rate of 2.25. Then the bondholder was given a 2 year zero-coupon bond with an implicit yield 
of 20%. Discounting at the yield of the DM Eurobond (adjusted to US dollar rates using the 
implicit discount embedded in currency futures at the time), delivers a haircut of 52% 
relative to the PV of the OVDP.  
 
Finally, on October 20, the government rescheduled the $109 million fiduciary loan that had 
been issued through Chase Manhattan, paying 25 percent ($27.25 million) in cash and the 
remainder in the form of a new fiduciary loan with a dollar interest rate of 16.75 percent. 
Payment of interest and principal was to happen in quarterly installments starting in 1999. 
Principal payment would be limited to $2 million per quarter during the first year, and the 
balance would be paid in four equal installments in 2000.
19 Table 4 shows the haircut on this 
restructuring. As the new loan did not trade, we discount the flows by the yield on the DM 
Eurobonds of the Ukraine republic adjusted to a dollar rate using the DM-US interest rate 
differential arising from future exchange contracts for the same maturity. When the new PV 
is compared with the value of the payment due, it delivers a haircut of 30%.  
 
In 1999, in the face of a bunching of debt service in the second quarter—in particular, 
repayment of the 10-month bond placed through ING Barings in August of 1998 ($163 
million including interest) maturing on June 9—the government was again forced to seek a 
                                                 
18 The future floating rates were inferred from the yield curve at the time of the exchange.  
19 IMF European II department, “Ukraine—Extended Arrangement—Financing Assurances Review, and 
Request for Waivers and Modification of Performance Criteria,” EBS/98/176, Supplement 1 (unpublished 
report to the Executive Board available under the IMF archives policy, Washington: International Monetary 
Fund), October 27, 1998, p.2.   - 17 - 
 
 
restructuring. On May 18, the Ministry of Finance submitted to ING a debt conversion offer, 
according to which 20 percent would be repaid on time, with the remainder swapped for a 
new international bond with a three year maturity. The ING bond was mostly held by one 
investor—Regent Pacific Group— initially insisted on full repayment.  
 
Ukraine’s first offer being rejected the original repayment date passed, but on July 15, the 
Ministry of Finance and ING Barings reached an agreement by which 20 percent of the bond 
would be repaid in cash, with the remainder exchanged for DM bonds, at a rate of 94.3 cents 
of new debt for each dollar of old debt. The DM bonds would be an additional issue of the 
existing DM 1 billion international bond issued in 1998 and due on February 2001, with a 
coupon of 16 percent. On August 2, 1999, Ukraine made the 20 percent cash payment to ING 
Barings. And on August 20, it tagged the original 2001 DM Eurobond for the remainder. 
Table 4 shows that this exchange entailed a haircut of about 35%.  
 
While these piecemeal restructurings provided some immediate cash flow relief, they also 
created large payments obligations for 2000 and 2001. For 2000, Ukraine’s debt service 
obligations were about $3 billion, including about $1.1 on bonds (principal and interest) $900 
million to the IMF, and $250 to Russia. However, gross international reserves stood at only 
around $1 billion at the end of 1999. There was no hope for any significant amount of new 
borrowing. Consequently, in early 2000, Ukraine had no alternative but to seek a new 
restructuring.  
  
On February 4, 2000, with ING Barings as lead manager, Ukraine launched a comprehensive 
exchange offer involving all outstanding commercial bonds. This included a Euro 500 
million, 14.75 percent Eurobond due in March 2000, the restructured $74 million 16.75 
percent Chase Manhattan bond maturing in October 2000, the remainder of a restructured 
Merrill Lynch Eurobond (US$258.4 million) falling due in October of 2000, and the DM 1.5 
billion, 16 percent Eurobond due in February 2001. In addition, there were about $1 billion 
of 8.5 percent bonds owed to the Russian energy exporter Gazprom falling due between 
March of 2000 and March of 2007. 
 
Creditors could choose between two 7-year coupon amortization bonds denominated either in 
Euros or U.S. dollars, to be issued under English law. For the Euro denominated bond, the 
coupon was set at 10 percent, while for the U.S. dollar denominated bond it was set at 11 
percent. The was no face value reduction except for the zero coupon Merrill Lynch 
Eurobond, where it was about 5 percent and for the “Gazprom bonds”, where it ranged 
between 0 and 33 percent depending on the maturity date of the bonds. Coupon payments for 
the new bonds were set on a quarterly basis, with no grace period for interest payments. 
Amortization was to occur twice a year, with 3 percent at each amortization date in 2001, 5 
percent in 2002, and 9.33 percent at each date between 2003 and 2007. Past due interest and 
accrued interest (i.e. interest accrued since the last scheduled coupon payment which was not 
yet payable) was paid in full and in cash. The exchange offer established a minimum 
participation threshold of 85 percent among the holders of bonds maturing in 2000-2001. In 
the event, there was almost full participation. 
   - 18 - 
 
 
In Table 5 all claims (present values of old instruments, past due interest and principal, cash 
payments, and the number of units of new instruments received) are computed for 100 units 
of principal outstanding at the time of the exchange.
20 In addition to one case of past due 
interest (on the DM Eurobond, whose annual 16 percent coupon payment was missed in 
February 2000), there is a case of past due principal from a missed amortization payment due 
in January 2000; according to the IMF (2001), these payments were missed for “intercreditor 
equity” reasons, i.e. to avoid paying some investors in full during or immediately before a 
debt restructuring offer. Note that while past due interest and principal need to added to the 
forward looking present value of the old instrument in order to establish the total claim, 
accrued interest is automatically reflected in the present value, since it is embodied in the 
first coupon payment coming due.  
 
One difficulty compared to the case of Russia is that only the two newly issued Eurobonds 
were trading in the market after the exchange; thus, it is not possible to interpolate yields 
based on a full Eurobond yield curve for the purpose of discounting, as was the case for 
Russia. Instead, the yields used for discounting are those of the actual new instruments used 























                                                 
20 Thus, for the amortizing Chase Manhattan loan shown in the second column, present values, PDP, etc. are 
expressed as percentages of the principal that had not been repaid by February of 2000 (89 percent of the 





















































Holders Chase Manhattan ING Loan
Old Instruments
Issue date 08/19/98 08/18/98 10/20/97 08/09/98
Amount issued (US$ mn) 9 35 109 163
Amount outstanding (US$ mn)  1 35 109 163
Maturity date 05/12/99 08/18/99 10/20/98 07/09/99
Coupon (percent) 0.0 0.0 10.0 17.5
Discount rate used (yield, in percent) 64.9% 60.5%
Present value on 8/98 (per 100 principal) 68.73 62.30
Present value on 10/98 (per 100 principal) 100.00
Present value on 8/99 (per 100 principal) 100.00
New Instruments and Cash obtained
Recognized value of old instrument (per $100 of Principal) 68.73 62.30 100.00 100.00
Discount rate used (yield, in percent):   54.8% 74.1% 76.3% 81.6%
Cash Payment 
Per $100 of Principal 0.00 0.00 25.00 20.00
Lower Bound - Shortest Maturity 8/26/2001 (68.7% of total recognized value)
Per $100 of Principal 63.40
Upper Bound - Longest Maturity 8/26/2004 (68.7% of total recognized value)
Per $100 of Principal 63.67
Eurobond Merrill Lynch 8/26/2000 (62.3% of total recognized value)
Per $100 of Principal 29.59
Chase Manhattan 10/20/2000 (75% of total recognized value)
Per $100 of Principal 44.34
ING Loan 2/26/2001 (80% of total recognized value)
Per $100 of Principal 44.51
Lower Bound - Total Value received 63.40
Upper Bound - Total Value received 63.67
Eurobond Merrill Lynch - Total Value received 29.59
Chase Manhattan - Total Value received 69.34
ING Loan - Total Value received 64.51
Haircuts based on shotest 3 years bond (lower bound) 7.8%
Haircut based on longest 6 years bond (upper bound) 7.4%
Haircut - Eurobond Merrill Lynch 52.5%
Haircut - Chase Manhattan 30.7%
Haircut - ING Loan 35.5%
Table 4. Ukraine Domestic Exchanges
















































2000 US$ Chase Merrill - 2001 DM Gazprom
Eurobond Manhattan Lynch Eurobond bonds  1/
Old Instruments
Issue date 3/1/1998 10/20/1998 10/1/1998 26/02/1998 21/03/1995
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 2/ 3/ 493 82 500 756 1,015
Amount outstanding (in US$ mn) 3/ 493 74 258 756 1,015
Currency of denomination Euro US$ US$ DM US$
Maturity date 3/1/2000 10/20/2000 10/1/2000 2/26/2001 3/21/2007
Average remaining life (years) 4/ 0.07 0.42 0.66 1.06 3.58
Coupon (percent) 14.75 16.75 0 16 8.5
Present value of cash flow on 2/4/2000 (per 100 principal) 5/ 112.4 73.6 122.1 90.4 63.8
Discount rate used (in percent) 6/ 27.6% 27.9% 28.1% 28.3% 29.5%
Past due principal (per 100 outstanding) by February 4, 2000 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Past due interest (per 100) up to 3/15/2000 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.0
Present value including PDP and PDI 112.4 98.6 122.1 106.4 63.8
New Instruments and Cash obtained
Cash payments (for PDI and accrued interest) 14.7 6.7 0.0 16.8 1.7
Option 1: 2007 10 percent Euro-denominated Eurobond
Price on issue date 59.1 59.1 59.1 59.1 59.1
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 100.0 100.0 94.6 100.0 81.9
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 59.1 59.1 55.9 59.1 48.4
Option 2: 2007 11 percent US$-denominated Eurobond
Price on issue date 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 100.0 100.0 94.6 100.0 81.9
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 58.9 58.9 55.7 58.9 48.2
Total value obtained if chose Euro bond (per 100 of principal) 73.8 65.9 55.9 76.0 50.2
Total value obtained if chose US$ bond (per 100 of principal) 73.5 65.6 55.7 75.7 50.0
Haircut based on choice of Euro bond (in percent) 34.4% 33.2% 54.2% 28.6% 21.4%
Haircut based on choice of Dollar bond (in percent) 34.6% 33.4% 54.4% 28.9% 21.7%
1/ Simple average, i.e. synthetic instrument consiting of all 29 outstanding Gazprom bonds in equal parts.
3/ Evaluated using February 4, 2000 market exchange rates
4/ Weighted average of time of amortization, using percent amortization in each time period as weights.
6/ Yield to maturity of new bond of corresponding currency, with minor maturity adjustment based on US yield curve.
Table 5. Ukraine External Debt Exchange
(February 4-April 7, 2000)
2/ For Chase Manhattan loan, the difference between amounts issued and outstanding is due to amortization during 1999.  For 
Merrill Lynch bond, it is due to the retiring of principal after July 1999 exchange offer.
5/ Includes accrued interest.  - 21 - 
 
 
The main result is that while in this case there were no significant nominal haircuts except on 
some of the “Gazprom bonds”, the present value losses were significant, ranging from about 
22 to 54 percent. Not surprisingly, the haircut did not depend much on which of the two new 
bonds was chosen by investors.  However, it varied quite significantly across the old bonds. 
Two main facts stand out: first, the haircut suffered by the Merrill Lynch bond (54 percent) 
stands out. In an accounting sense, this is due to the fact that the PV of the cash flow of this 
bond was higher than the rest, with a large nominal return of 44 percent expected in October, 
while the terms of restructuring were slightly worse (perhaps because it was felt that since a 
zero coupon bond was being exchanged for an 11 percent coupon bond, a small face value 
reduction was appropriate). Second, except for the Merrill Lynch bond, bonds with shorter 
life suffered larger haircuts than bonds with longer life. This can be observed both for the 
bonds shown and within the class of Gazprom bonds. Thus, the larger nominal haircuts 
applied to longer dated Gazprom bonds did not completely offset the smaller present values 
of the longer bonds at the discount rates applied in our calculations. We return to this point in 
the last section of the paper. 
 
C.   Pakistan
21 
Pakistan’s 1999 Eurobond restructuring originated from a history of high public debt (about 
90 percent of GDP since the early 1990s) and a major balance of payments crisis in May of 
1998 triggered by international sanctions imposed after a series of nuclear tests. After the 
lifting of most sanctions in late 1998, Pakistan negotiated a Paris Club restructuring in 
January of 1999 which required the country to seek comparable debt relief from private 
creditors, and in particular, to restructure its international bonds. By July, the government 
had signed a rescheduling with commercial banks covering about $900 million in 
commercial loans, but it held off on restructuring its Eurobonds, as no principal repayments 
were coming due until the end of the year. Finally, on November 15, Pakistan launched a 
bond exchange, ahead of a Paris club deadline that required it to show “progress” in 
negotiations with bondholders by the end of 1999. No interest or principal payments were 
missed prior to the exchange. 
 
The exchange involved swapping three bonds: a $150 million, 11.5 percent Eurobond due in 
December 1999; a $160 million, 6 percent exchangeable note due in February 2002 with a 
put option in February 2000; and a $300 million Libor-plus-3.95 percent floating rate note 
due in May of 2000. All three would be exchanged for a new amortizing bond with an overall 
maturity of six years and a three-year grace period, paying a 10 percent coupon. There was 
no nominal haircut; in fact, holders of the two bonds with the shorter average life received 
slightly more in nominal terms than under the original instruments (Table 6).  
                                                 
21 This chapter relies on Helbling (2001), Burki (2000), IMF Country Reports No. 97/120, 01/11, 01/24, 01/222 
and 03/338, the IMF Staff Report for the 1998 Article IV consultation (unpublished but publicly available under 
the IMF’s policy of releasing most Executive Board documents that are more than five years old) financial 


































Table 6 is similar in structure but simpler than most of the previous tables, as there was only 
one exchange option and no need to reimburse past due interest or principal. Haircuts were of 
about the same order as the average haircut in the case of Ukraine, i.e. about 30 percent.   
 
Unlike Ukraine, however, there was not much variation in the magnitude of haircuts across 
the old instruments. In this respect, the Pakistan exchange resembles the Russian PRINs and 
IANs exchange. Also as in the case of Russia, the remaining life of the original instruments 
was almost the same across instruments (in this case, very short). 
 
Old Instruments
Issue date 12/22/1994 2/26/1997 5/30/1997
Amount issued (US$ mn) 150 160 300
Amount outstanding (US$ mn) 150 160 300
Maturity date 1/ 12/22/1999 2/26/2002 5/30/2000
Average remaining life (years) 0.025 0.205 0.463
Coupon (percent) 11.5 6 libor + 3.95
Present value of cash flow on 12/13/1999 (per 100 of principal) 2/ 105.3 99.7 96.8
Discount rate used (in percent) 3/ 21.4% 21.4% 21.4%
New Instrument
2005 percent amortizing Eurobond with 10 percent coupon
Amount issued (US$ mn) -4.8 -9.1 0.0
Price on issue date 68.1 68.1 68.1
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 103.2 105.7 100.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 70.3 72.0 68.1
Haircut 33.3% 27.8% 29.7%
1/ 2002 Bond had put option in February 2000.
3/ Yield to maturity on new 2005 Eurobond, with a minor maturity correction based on the US yield curve.
2/ Includes accrued interest. For puttable 2002 bond, we assume that the option to put would have been used for 
entire outstanding amount in February of 2000
Table 6. Pakistan Eurobond Exchange
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D.   Ecuador
22 
Ecuador’s debt crisis occurred less than five years after a Brady deal with commercial banks 
had reduced the country’s external debt to sustainable, though still high, debt levels. It 
originated in a banking crisis that erupted in April of 1998 and became progressively worse 
due to a lack of crisis resolution instruments and political obstacles. Central Bank liquidity 
support to failing banks put pressure led to a currency crisis in early 1999, and by mid-1999, 
net international reserves had fallen to levels that made it very difficult to meet upcoming 
debt service payments—about $550 million on Brady and Eurobonds during the remainder of 
1999 and 2000, and maturing domestic debt in the order of US$500 million—without 
agreement on an IMF program. But the IMF in turn required some degree of “private sector 
bail-in” to help close the financing gap and return to sustainable debt levels.  
 
Against this background, on August 25, 1999, Ecuador announced that it would suspend 
coupon payments on Discount and PDI Brady bonds. After a failed attempt to persuade the 
Brady bondholders to accept a debt exchange limited to Brady bonds, Ecuador also defaulted 
on its remaining Brady bonds and, by the end of October, on its Eurobonds. It was the first 
default on international sovereign bonds since the 1930s (previous postwar defaults—
including during the 1980s debt crisis, and the Russian and Ukrainian defaults of 1998–– had 
affected only commercial bank loans and domestic debt). In addition, about US$ 500 million 
of short-term domestic dollar-denominated debt was restructured to longer maturities at a 
reduced rate of interest.
23 
 
With IMF support, on July 27, 2000, Ecuador launched an offer to exchange its defaulted 
Brady Bonds and Eurobonds for new uncollateralized bonds maturing in 2030 with a step-up 
coupon starting at 4 percent and rising to 10 percent, in 1 percent steps, by 2006 (Table 7). 
For each type of defaulted bond, an exchange ratio was set in line with “stripped” secondary 
market prices; thus, the idea was to treat each bond equally based on their pre-default prices. 
The shortest instruments, namely Eurobonds and Brady Interest Equalization bonds were 
exchanged at par, while the longer dated Brady bonds were exchanged at 1:0.78 (PDI bonds), 
1:0.58 (Discount bonds) and 1:0.40 (Pars). Holders of Par and Discount bonds also received 
a cash payment equal to the present value of their U.S. collateral. Past due interest and 
principal were repaid in cash, while accrued interest (interest owed since the last scheduled 
coupon payment) was exchanged, at par, for a new Republic bond with a fixed coupon of 12 
percent, maturing in 2012. Bondholders could also elect to exchange their principal for this 
shorter bond rather than the 2030 bonds at the price of a further 35 percent discount relative 
to the face value of the 2030 bonds. The aggregate amount of 2012 bonds was limited to 1.25 
billion, and holders of Eurobonds and shorter dated Brady bonds were given priority in the 
                                                 
22 This chapter is based on Jacome (2004), Fischer (2001), Beckerman (2002), Bucheit (2000), IMF Staff 
Country Reports, and news reports. 
23 IMF (2002) suggests that the PV loss in the domestic exchange was 9% but we have not been able to confirm 
this.    - 24 - 
 
 
allocation of the 2012 bonds. By the time the exchange was finalized on August 23, over 97 
percent of the eligible bonds had agreed to tender.  
 
Two technical issues in Table 7 are worth mentioning. First, although our general principle is 
to compute the present value of the old instruments using the yield on the new instruments as 
the discount rate, the 2025 principal repayments scheduled for the Par and Discount bonds 
are discounted using the US long treasury bill rate, since these repayments were 
collateralized and not subject to country risk. Ceteris paribus, collateralization thus increases 
the present value of the old instruments and the value received in the exchange in equal 
measure (since the latter involved the release of the collateral), which means that it has no 

















































































Pars Discounts PDIs IEs 2002 Euro 2004 Euro
Old Instruments
Issue date 02/28/1995 02/28/1995 02/28/1995 12/21/1994 04/25/1997 04/25/1997
Amount issued (US$ mn) 1,655 1,435 2,308 191 350 150
Amount outstanding (US$ mn) 1/ 1,655 1,435 2,775 143 350 150
Maturity date 02/28/2025 02/28/2025 02/27/2015 12/21/2004 04/25/2002 04/25/2004
Average remaining life (years) 2/ 24.5 24.5 10.59 2.56 1.67 3.67
Coupon (percent) 3-5 step up libor+13/16 libor+13/16 libor+13/16 11.25 libor +4.75
Present value of cash flow on August 23 (PV1) 3/ 49.0 66.3 46.4 76.6 90.1 79.8
Discount rate used (in percent) 4/ 21.1 21.1 21.8 22.6 22.6 22.6
Present value of cash flow on August 23 (PV2) 3/ 48.5 64.8 45.0 75.5 89.2 78.5
Discount rate used (in percent) 5/ 21.6% 22.0% 22.4% 23.4% 23.5% 23.3%
Past due principal (PDP, per 100 of principal) 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00
Past due interest (PDI, per 100 principal) 6/ 4.10 4.68 1.96 7.29 12.05 11.25
PV1 + PDI + PDP 53.1 70.9 48.3 93.9 102.2 91.0
PV2 + PDI + PDP 52.6 69.4 46.9 92.8 101.2 89.7
New Instruments and Cash obtained
Cash payments
Release of principal collateral  (per 100 of principal) 23.5 23.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Payment for PDI and PDP (per 100 of principal) 4.1 4.7 2.0 17.3 12.0 11.3
2030 Eurobond with 4/5/6/7/8/9/10 percent step-up coupon
Amounts issued (US$ mn) 7/ 662.0 832.3 1169.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Price on issue date 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2 36.2
Units obtained for principal (per 100 of principal) 40.0 58.0 78.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Value obtained for principal (per 100 of principal) 14.5 21.0 28.2 36.2 36.2 36.2
2012 Eurobond with 12 percent coupon
Amounts issued (US$ mn)  7/ 15.6 50.7 745.0 95.1 240.4 103.2
Price on issue date 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.2
Units obtained for accrued interest (per 100 princ.) 0.9 3.5 3.5 1.4 3.7 3.8
Value obtained for accrued interest (per 100 princ.) 0.6 2.1 2.1 0.8 2.2 2.3
if elected instead of 2030 bonds:
Units obtained for principal (per 100 of principal) 26.0 37.7 50.7 65.0 65.0 65.0
Value obtained for principal (per 100 of principal) 15.7 22.7 30.5 39.1 39.1 39.1
Total value obtained 42.6 51.3 33.4 57.3 53.4 52.7
Haircut based on PV1 (in percent) 19.7% 27.7% 30.9% 39.0% 47.7% 42.2%
Haircut based on PV2 (in percent) 19.0% 26.1% 28.9% 38.3% 47.2% 41.3%
2/ Weighted average of time of amortization, using percent of remaining amortization in each time period as weights.
3/ Including accrued interest
6/ Including interest on principal and interest arrears.
5/ Yield corresponding to average life, using linear interpolation of outstanding Eurobond yields. For Pars and Discounts, 2025 principal was 
discounted using US long rate.
7/ Based on the assumption that all bondholders opted for the 2012 bond and were rationed as announced in the exchange offer (i.e.  shorter 
instruments had priority; the 2012 would be prorated within the marginal class, i.e. PDI bonds).
Table 7. Ecuador Exchange
(July 27-August 23, 2000)
1/ For PDIs, difference between amount issued and outstanding is due to capitalization of interest payments prior to the exchange; for IEs, 
difference is due to amortization payments made between June 1995 and June 1999.
4/ Yield of new bond actually used to exchange principal of respective old bond (2030 for Pars and Discounts, 2012 for IEs and Eurobonds, 
and a mix for the PDI bond). For Pars and Discounts, 2025 principal was discounted using US long rate.  - 26 - 
 
 
Second, unlike in the Ukrainian exchange, past due principal—which existed for IE bonds, 
which were amortizing bonds—was repaid in cash. As a result, the present values of old 
instruments, number of units of new instruments, etc. shown for the IE bonds refer to 100 
units of principal outstanding after repayment of PDP, which was 65 percent of the original 
principal. Similarly, for PDI bonds, which were capitalizing bonds (part of the coupon 
payments were rolled into a rising principal amount) the values refer to the principal 
outstanding at the time of the exchange, which as about 118 percent of the original principal.  
 
The main results are as follows. As expected, the 2012 option delivered a slightly higher 
value (compare lines “value obtained for principal” for the 2030 and 2012 bonds), and thus 
was rationed. As in the case of Ukraine, there were substantial differences in the haircuts 
across instruments, ranging between 19 and 48 percent. Again, the bonds with the longest 
remaining average life tend to suffer the smallest NPV haircuts (in the 20-30 percent range), 
while the largest haircuts are associated with the shortest instruments, notwithstanding the 
fact that the longer instruments were subjected to larger reductions in face value. Ex post, it 
turns out that these reductions were insufficient to equalize the NPV haircuts; consequently, 
there is a negative correlation between NPV haircuts and nominal haircuts. 
  
Aside from being the first debt exchange to involve Brady bonds, Ecuador’s exchange was 
innovative in several respects. The new bonds contained two novel features meant to 
minimize the chances of a new debt restructuring in the foreseeable future and protect the 
interests of bondholders. A “mandatory debt management” provision committed Ecuador to 
retiring a minimum proportion of the face value of each of the new bonds every year. A 
“principal reinstatement” provision meant that a payment default occurring in the first 10 
years would automatically result in the issuance of additional 2030 bonds to the holders. The 
effect of this was to offer a (limited) protection of bondholders against the dilution of their 
claims by new debt holders in the event of default. Finally, for the first time in sovereign 
debt, the Ecuador exchange used “exit amendments” to put pressure on potential holdouts. 
As part of the exchange, Ecuador solicited the consent of existing bondholders to change 
various non-payment terms of the old instruments, which (unlike the payment terms) could 
be changed with simple majority, with the effect of reducing the liquidity of non-tendered 
bonds and stripping them from various creditor protections. 
 
E.   Argentina 
In November 2001, after several attempts at balancing the budget and avoiding a 
restructuring of debt obligations, a substantial reduction in tax collection together with the 
lack of additional access either to market or multilateral funds forced the government to seek 
debt relief through a “voluntary” exchange in two stages. The first stage (Phase 1) would be 
targeted at domestic residents and the second (Phase 2) to nonresidents. The idea was to 
segment local and foreign bondholders to protect the local financial institutions and domestic 
pension funds by guaranteeing the resources to honor the obligations with them. In the end, 
Phase 1 did happen, but shortly after the government was ousted in a civilian coup that 
decided on a broader default; thus Phase 2 never materialized. 
   - 27 - 
 
 
The strategy of the “Phase 1” exchange was to offer local holders of Argentina’s bonds to 
swap their bonds for a “guaranteed” loan governed by Argentine law. The guarantee of the 
loan would be the revenues collected through the financial transaction tax. Moreover, 
bondholders were given the option of recovering the original bonds if any terms or conditions 
of the guaranteed loans were changed in the future. In exchange for the granting of the 
guarantee, interest payments would be reduced and maturities extended. The holders of the 
bond were given one to three options depending on the instrument. One option was a fixed 
rate bond in which interest rates would be reduced by 30 percent relative to the original rate, 
with a cap at 7 percent per annum. Maturities were also extended on shorter term instruments 
and interest payments made monthly, in order to match interest payments with the collection 
of the financial transaction tax. For floating rate bonds a similar conditions were imposed the 
cap being set at Libor plus 300bps. Finally, a third option was to convert into a capitalizing 
bond with maturity in 2011. Only a few bonds were offered this alternative.  
 
Several incentives for participation were offered, including the fact that the new instrument 
would carry an accounting benefit in that for banks and pension funds the new instrument 
could be valued at par rather than marked to market. However, the main incentive was the 
threat of an involuntary restructuring at worst terms if the exchange was not accepted.
24 The 
obligation was considered a technical default by rating agencies and S&P moved Argentina 
to the selective default (SD) category.  
 
The bond exchange was successful in the sense that almost all debt in the hands of banks, 
local pension funds and local residents was tendered.  In all, 41 billion of debt instruments 
were tendered implying a reduction of 2.35 billion in interest and 2.5 in amortizations in 
2002 alone. Financing needs were reduced by US$26.2 billion in the first five years. 
 
From the perspective of computing haircuts, Argentina’s Phase 1 exchange poses unique 
challenges. To begin with, the number of old and new instruments involved was much larger 
than in any previous exchange. Most importantly, there was no secondary market for the new 
domestic instruments immediately after the exchange. As a result, the methodology used in 
our previous computations—to discount both new and old payment streams with the 
maturity-adjusted “exit yield”—cannot be applied. Instead, our approach is to compare the 
old and new payments streams using two alternative discount rates that arguably constitute 
upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the true, unobservable, exit yield, as follows. 
 
First, while the new instruments were not initially traded, the old instruments—which 
continued to be held by nonresident and some resident bondholders—were, and post-
exchange yields for these instruments are available. However, because the government had 
announced that the new instruments would in effect be treated as senior—the declared 
intention was to restructure the old instruments in a second phase while attempting to service 
                                                 
24 The “guarantee” that was supposed to back the new loans was given comparatively little importance as all 
government debt is guaranteed by tax collection.    - 28 - 
 
 
the new ones— the yield on the old instrument can be regarded as an upper bound for the 
unobservable yield of the new instruments.  This is also clear from the fact that most of the 
local bondholders that were given a choice did in fact agree to exchange. The PV is estimated 
by discounting the new guaranteed loans by the yields on the bond with the closest average 
life (adjusted by the US T-bill yield curve when the two did not match perfectly). 
Second, the new instruments were eventually traded, in mid 2003, but at that time the 
instruments had suffered a new restructuring involving a currency conversion (pesification, 
more on this below), so that the prices and yields on these instruments at the time were 
useless for the purposes of evaluating the Phase 1 instruments that were denominated in US 
dollars. However, by then the government had issued post-default debt both in dollars and in 
indexed pesos. 
 
Thus we construct our lower bound as follows. Comparing the yields on the Boden 07 (a post 
default fairly liquid paper denominated in indexed pesos) and a guaranteed loan of similar 
average life (that corresponding to the restructuring of the Bonte 03) we computed the 
liquidity premium associated to the guaranteed loans to be equal to 2.7% (we keep this 
number fix thereafter). We then apply this liquidity premium to post default dollar 
instruments, in particular the Boden 2012 which started trading in September 2002 plus an 
adjustment by the US T bill yield curve when appropriate. Notice however, that by 
September 2002, much legal and political uncertainty had been resolved, a new arrangement 
with the IMF was in place, and the economy was rapidly recovering.  Thus, the observed 
yields at that time will almost certainly understate what the yields would have been in 
November of 2001. 
 
Table 8 contains haircut calculations for most of the exchanged instruments, using maturity 
adjusted yields derived from either the November 2001 yields on the old, mostly externally 
issued instruments (“upper bound”, or UB, estimates) or yields on the post default debt 
adjusted by a liquidity premium. Argentina had remained current on its payments until the 
exchange, so there was no PDI or past due principal, and there were no cash payments 
associated with the exchange. Most of the old bonds had two or three alternative conversion 
choices, generally including a longer fixed rate bond and a floating rate bond.  
 
The good news from Table 8 is that in spite of our inability to estimate the exit yield with any 
precision, the upper and lower bound haircut estimates corresponding to each old bond are 
not so far apart as to be meaningless. Based on option 1, which was given to all old 
instruments and which was generally the most favorable, almost all “lower bound” estimates 
exceed 25 percent while most “upper bound” estimates are below 50 percent. With a few 
exceptions, these results place the Argentine “Phase 1” exchange at about the same level of 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shortly after the Phase 1 exchange that we have just described, the government faced a bank 
run to which it reacted by imposing a deposit freeze. This, in turn, led to a civilian coup that 
eventually led to the fall of the government. The new administration defaulted on all the 
public debt, and shortly after (albeit, yet another government) devalued the currency. The 
devaluation led to a sharp increase in the nominal exchange rate, and therefore to the implicit 
debt burden given that most debt was denominated in US dollars. As a result, in March 2002 
the government decided to pesify the guaranteed loans. The government offered to convert 
dollar instruments at a rate of 1.40 pesos per dollar with a promise to index capital and 
interest payments by inflation. At the time the peso dollar exchange rate was closer to 1.9 so 
this entailed a substantial loss. In addition interest rates were further reduced for most of the 
instruments, with all, except for those with the longest maturity, being set at 2%. Table 9 
shows the results of the exchange. For brevity we show only the options available to the 
bonds that had exchanged at least 500 million US$ in the Phase 1 exchange.
25 Unfortunately 
there is no information as to how much those original bonds were traded into each category, 
thus we have no information as to the amount exchanged for each type.  
 
We discount the original dollar denominated instruments by the yield of dollar denominated 
instruments at the time, while the cash flow of the new instruments are discounted by the 
yield on the indexed peso bonds. We apply the adjustment for liquidity, corresponding to the 
guaranteed loans whenever applicable. The unweighted average delivers a haircut of 
35.7%.

















                                                 
25 Given that there were up to three options per bond exchanged in the Phase 1 the amount of information 
becomes unwieldy. The complete table for all instruments can be found in www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen. 
26 We have information of how much was traded in the Phase 1 exchange but there is no information as to how 
it was traded (i.e. into what instrument, of the several alternatives it was traded into). Thus there is no data as to 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4- 38 - 
 
 
F.   Uruguay
27 
As a result of a string of negative output shocks and deposits withdrawals related to the crisis 
in Argentina, Uruguay’s banking system came under pressure in 2002, and the largest 
domestically owned banks (two public and four private) began to experience difficulties. 
Rating agencies downgraded Uruguay below investment grade, further fuelling the crisis. 
Liquidity assistance by the Central Bank resources led to a quick depletion of reserves and 
eventually a currency crisis.  On June 19, 2002, the government decided to move to a floating 
exchange rate regime. The 50 percent exchange rate depreciation that followed led to a large 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio, raising doubt about the ability of the government to service 
the public debt, even after the banking crisis was brought under control by the end of the 
year.  
 
In early 2003, the government decided then to launch a debt exchange, geared to making debt 
payments sustainable and improve the liquidity of existing instruments. The exchange 
targeted all traded debt (about half of total debt). Eligible securities comprised (i) forty six 
domestically issued bonds and treasury bills, accounting for US$ 1.6 billion in principal; (ii) 
eighteen international bonds issued under foreign law, account for US$3.5 billion; and (iii) 
one “Samurai” bond issued in Japan, accounting for 250 US million.  
 
The international exchange offer was launched on April 10, 2003, and settlement took place 
on May 29. Participation was high (about 93 percent of eligible bonds). A combination of the 
use of exit consents to change the non-payment terms of the old bonds and regulatory 
incentives contributed to the high acceptance rate (see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2004, 
for details). 
 
The exchange offered most bondholders a choice between two options: 
 
•  a maturity extension option, under which each bond could be exchanged by another 
with similar coupon and extended maturity (in general, 5 years longer than the 
original), mixed in some cases with a 30 year bond, which capitalized part of the 
interest earned over the first four years.  
•  A benchmark bond option, under which investors received one of a smaller number of 
new bonds that were longer dated but more liquid (also mixed with a 30 year bond). 
Three external and four domestic benchmark bonds were introduced, with maturities 
ranging from seven to 30 years. Some of the bonds had step up coupons, to match the 
expected increase in floating rate and were geared to those trading out of floating rate 
bonds. These bonds were designed to be attractive not only to institutional investors 
                                                 
27 Complete information on the Uruguayan exchange can be obtained from Republica 






but also to index-tracking funds, assuming the new international bond issues were 
large enough to be included in international indices.  
In addition, some bondholders were offered small upfront cash payments to compensate for 
accrued interest on the old bonds (there was no past due interest or principal). Holders of two 
collateralized Brady bonds (the 2021 “Series A” and “Series B bonds”) also received the 
present value of the principal repayment in cash. 
 
Table 10 shows the precise terms of the exchange and computes haircuts for the 18 
exchanged international bonds. As in the case of the Argentina, the computations are 
complicated by the large number of bonds and options offered, as well as by the fact that 
secondary market prices are not available for some of the new bonds that were part of the 
menu (either because they were illiquid or because they were in fact not issued due to lack of 
interest). However, prices and hence exit yields are available for all fixed coupon US dollar 
denominated and for the two Euro denominated bonds. Using these, Table 11 computes the 
haircuts, for each old instrument and each of the two exchange options, under two alternative 
approaches: First, using the yield of the new instrument actually received to discount the old 
cash flows, regardless of differences in maturity; second, using a yield corresponding to the 
remaining life of the old instrument interpolated from the available yields of the new US 
dollar bonds, with a maturity correction based on the US yield curve at the short end. The 
latter can be used for all dollar denominated old bonds; while the use of the former depends 
on whether secondary market prices were available for the new instruments. Since this was 
always the case under the “benchmark option” but not necessarily under the “extension 
option,” our haircut estimates for the latter are somewhat less complete. 
 
The main result is that the haircuts for the Uruguay exchange were substantially lower than 
in any of the other exchanges studied in this paper, namely in the range of 10-15 percent. 
Between the two options available, the minimum haircut faced by investors never exceeded 
20 percent, and may have been as low as 7 percent or lower.
28 While there is some variation 
in the haircuts across old instruments, this does not appear to have been very large, and a 
pattern relating the remaining life of the old instrument to the haircut suffered, as observed 
for Ukraine and Ecuador, is not discernible. 
                                                 
28 There is one outlier at the low end—the 2002 convertible US$ bond. This is likely due to the fact that the PV 
of the cash flow of this bond is currently computed under the assumption that it is held until maturity, i.e. 
ignoring any option for early repayment, which would tend to raise the value of the bond and hence the haircut. 
We are in the process of revising this. - 40 - 
 
US$ 7.875 € 7.0  US$ New US$ 8.375  US$  £
2003 2005 Money 2006 Convertible Convertible
Characteristics of Old Instruments
Issue Date 18/11/98 26/09/00 19/02/91 26/09/96 19/02/91 19/02/91
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 1/ 200 266 90 100 335 93
Amount outstanding (in US$ mn) 1/ 191 264 32 97 141 39
Coupon (in percent) 7.875 7.000libor + 1.00 8.375 libor + 0.875 libor + 0.875
Maturity date 18/11/03 26/09/05 19/02/06 26/09/06 19/02/07 19/02/07
Average life (years) 2/ 0.47 2.33 1.43 3.33 1.93 1.93
Present value (1) (per 100 of principal) 95.4 95.9 ... 87.4 ... ...
Discount rate used (in percent) 3/ 4/ 18.7 11.4 ... 14.2 ... ...
Present value (2) (per 100 of principal) 98.1 94.6 88.8 92.1 85.0 89.6
Discount rate used (in percent) 5/ 4/ 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2
Present value (3) (per 100 of principal) 97.9 ... 88.0 89.0 83.8 ...
Discount rate used (in percent) 6/ 4/ 12.6 ... 12.9 13.5 13.1 ...
New Instruments and Cash obtained
1. "Extension Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0
Extension Bond (coupon/denomination like original bond).
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 2/ 83.6 111.0 1.4 60.8 5.4 --
Maturity 18/11/08 26/09/12 02/07/09 26/09/11 02/01/10 02/01/10
Price on issue date 65.05 79.25 ... 73.77 ... ...
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 95 100 95 100 95 95
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 61.8 79.3 ... 73.8 ... ...
Long Bond (7.875 maturing  in 2033; total issue US$ 1055.6 million)
Price on issue date
Units obtained (per 100 of principal)
Value obtained (per 100 of principal)
Total Value Extension Option 66.8 79.3 ... 73.8 ... ...
2. "Benchmark Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 7.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0
Benchmark Bond (US$; total issue $500 mn for 2011 and $1059.5 mn for 2015 bond)
Coupon 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25
Maturity 15/02/11 15/02/11 15/02/11 15/02/11 15/02/11 15/02/11
Price on issue date 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 109.0 100.0 93.9 107.0 92.9 92.9
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 83.9 76.9 72.3 82.3 71.5 71.5
Long Bond (7.875 maturing  in 2033; total issue US$ 1055.6 million)
Price on issue date
Units obtained (per 100 of principal)
Value obtained (per 100 of principal)
Total Value Benchmark Option 90.9 76.9 77.3 82.3 76.5 76.5
Haircut based on extension option (percent)
Based on Present Value (1) 0.3 0.2 ... 0.2 ... ...
Based on Present Value (3) 0.3 ... ... 0.2 ... ...
Haircut based on benchmark option (percent)
Based on Present Value (2) 7.4 18.7 13.0 10.7 10.0 14.6
Based on Present Value (3) 7.2 ... 12.2 7.5 8.7 ...
2/ Weighted average of time of amortization, using percent amortization in each time period as weights.
1/ Evaluated using February 4, 2000 market exchange rates
3/ Average yield to maturity (YTM) of new instruments actually obtained in extension option.
5/ Average yield to maturity (YTM) of new instruments actually obtained in benchmark option.
6/ YTM corresponding to average life of old bond, using interpolation of yield of new US$ bonds.
Table 10. Uruguay Debt Exchange (International Bonds)
(April 10-May 29, 2003)






 US$ CLP 7.0 US$ 7.0 US$ 7.875 US$ 7.25 US$ 8.75
Convertible 2007 2008 2009 2009 2010
Characteristics of Old Instruments
Issue Date 26/04/02 29/11/00 06/04/98 25/03/02 04/05/99 22/06/00
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 1/ 150 118 250 250 250 300
Amount outstanding (in US$ mn) 1/ 150 118 240 248 15 274
Coupon (in percent) libor + 0.559 7.000 7.000 7.875 7.250 8.750
Maturity date 26/04/07 29/05/07 7/4/2008 25/03/09 4/5/2009 22/06/10
Average life (years) 2/ 3.17 4.00 4.83 5.83 5.92 7.08
Present value (1) (per 100 of principal) ... ... 82.3 83.7 79.8 87.1
Discount rate used (in percent) 3/ 4/ ... ... 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.7
Present value (2) (per 100 of principal) 87.4 85.9 84.0 86.0 81.7 90.1
Discount rate used (in percent) 5/ 4/ 12.2 11.8 11.8 11.9 11.9 11.9
Present value (3) (per 100 of principal) 84.5 ... 77.8 78.7 74.6 82.6
Discount rate used (in percent) 6/ 4/ 13.4 ... 13.9 14.1 14.0 13.9
New Instruments and Cash obtained
1. "Extension Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Extension Bond
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 2/ -- -- 64.2 20.0 31.5 50.6
Maturity 26/04/12 29/05/12 01/04/13 25/03/14 04/05/14 22/06/15
Price on issue date ... ... 70.65 74.04 70.66 76.72
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 100 100 100 80 80 70
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) ... ... 70.7 59.2 56.5 53.7
Long Bond
Price on issue date 64.3 64.3 64.3
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 20 20 30
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 12.9 12.9 19.3
Total Value Extension Option ... ... 70.7 72.1 69.4 73.0
2. "Benchmark Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Benchmark Bond
Coupon 7.25 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
Maturity 15/02/11 15/03/15 15/03/15 15/03/15 15/03/15 15/03/15
Price on issue date 76.9 74.2 74.2 74.2 74.2 74.2
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 110.0 95.0 101.0 85.0 80.0 78.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 84.6 70.5 74.9 63.1 59.3 57.9
Long Bond
Price on issue date 64.3 64.3 64.3
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 20.0 20.0 30.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 12.9 12.9 19.3
Total Value Benchmark Option 84.6 70.5 74.9 75.9 72.2 77.1
Haircut based on extension option (percent)
Based on Present Value (1) ... ... 14.1 13.9 13.1 16.2
Based on Present Value (3) ... ... 9.2 8.5 7.0 11.6
Haircut based on benchmark option (percent)
Based on Present Value (2) 3.2 18.0 10.9 11.7 11.6 14.4
Based on Present Value (3) -0.2 ... 3.7 3.6 3.2 6.6
Table 10. Uruguay Debt Exchange (International Bonds) (cont.)






CLP 6.375 € 7.00 US$ 7.625 US$ 6.75 US$ 6.75 US$ 7.875
2011 2011 2012 Series A  Series B 2027
Characteristics of Old Instruments
Issue Date 15/03/01 28/6/01 21/11/01 18/02/91 02/12/91 15/07/97
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 1/ 127 237 410 331 199 510
Amount outstanding (in US$ mn) 1/ 127 65 410 110 8 30
Coupon (in percent) 6.375 7.000 7.625 6.750 6.750 7.875
Maturity date 15/03/11 28/6/11 20/01/12 19/'02/21 21/03/21 15/07/27
Average life (years) 2/ 7.79 8.08 8.67 17.75 17.83 24.17
Present value (1) (per 100 of principal) ... 87.2 78.5 97.5 95.7 71.2
Discount rate used (in percent) 3/ 4/ ... 10.7 12.6 12.2 12.2 12.2
Present value (2) (per 100 of principal) 74.4 82.1 81.0 97.5 95.7 71.2
Discount rate used (in percent) 5/ 4/ 12.0 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.2 12.2
Present value (3) (per 100 of principal) ... ... 74.0 96.5 94.7 73.7
Discount rate used (in percent) 6/ 4/ ... ... 13.7 12.6 12.5 11.8
New Instruments and Cash obtained
1. "Extension Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 38.0 0.0
Extension Bond
Amount issued (in US$ mn) 2/ 2.12415 139.3 41.1 ... ... ...
Maturity 15/03/16 28/6/19 20/01/17 ... ... ...
Price on issue date ... 72.35 66.84 ... ... ...
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 100 100 60 0.0 0.0 0.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) ... 72.4 40.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Long Bond
Price on issue date 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 40 70 70 100
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 25.7 45.0 45.0 64.3
Total Value Extension Option ... 72.4 65.8 83.0 83.0 64.3
2. "Benchmark Option"
Cash obtained (per 100 or principal) 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.0 38.0 0.0
Benchmark Bond
Coupon ... 7.5 7.5 ... ... ...
Maturity ... 15/03/15 15/03/15 ... ... ...
Price on issue date ... 74.2 74.2 ... ... ...
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 0.0 85.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 0.0 63.1 44.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Long Bond
Price on issue date 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3 64.3
Units obtained (per 100 of principal) 95.0 0.0 40.0 70.0 70.0 100.0
Value obtained (per 100 of principal) 61.0 0.0 25.7 45.0 45.0 64.3
Total Value Benchmark Option 61.0 63.1 70.2 83.0 83.0 64.3
Haircut based on extension option (percent)
Based on Present Value (1) ... 17.1 16.2 14.9 13.3 9.8
Based on Present Value (3) ... ... 11.1 14.0 12.4 12.8
Haircut based on benchmark option (percent)
Based on Present Value (2) 17.9 23.2 13.3 14.9 13.3 9.8
Based on Present Value (3) ... ... 5.1 14.0 12.4 12.8
Table 10. Uruguay Debt Exchange (International Bonds only) (cont.)




Table 11 shows the results of a similar restructuring applied to the Uruguayan domestic 
bonds that included a total of forty six bonds. Treasury bills were paid 15% in cash the 
remained being traded either into a fixed rate bond with a coupon of 5.25% and maturing in 
2006, or into a step up coupon with a maturity in 2010. Coupons increased from 4% to 7% 
with an annual increase of 0.5% between 15 June 2004 and through 2009. For briefness in 




Fixed rate bonds included bonds numbered 29, 30 and 31. Government bonds numbered 29, 
originally maturing in 2005, could be converted into a fixed rate bond maturing in 2010 with 
a coupon of 7.5% or into a step up coupon as above with a negative nominal haircut of 5%. 
Number 30, originally maturing in 2011, was traded into a fixed coupon rate maturing in 
2019 with a fixed rate of 7.5% and number 31, originally maturing in 2012, was either traded 
by a fixed rate bond maturing in 2020 and a rate of 9.75% or into a bond with a fixed rate of 
7.5%, maturing in 2019 and with a negative nominal haircut of 115%. 
 
Bonds associated to the social security system (previsionales) maturing in 2007 were 
exchanged by a fixed rate bond maturing in 2012 with a coupon of 7.625% or a step up 
coupon bond as above (coupon increases in may of each year) maturing in 2013 and with a 
negative haircut of 110%.  Those maturing in 2010 were trade either by a fixed  coupon bond 
with a 8% rate maturing in 2018 or a 2019 bond with a coupon of 7.5% and a negative 
nominal haircut of 5%.  
 
Floating rate bonds numbered 32 through 54 received in general two options. One was a 
floating rate bond paying Libor + a premia of between 175 and 200bps and, typically (but not 
always) a maturity extension of five years. The alternative was a step up coupon with rates 
ranging from 4 to 7% with annual increases of 0.5% between 2004 and 2009. Bonds 
maturing in 2003 receive some cash payments, but those maturing in 2004 or later did not. 
 
Table 11 shows the haircuts involved. As can be seen they fall very much in line with those 
suffered by international investors, thus Uruguay seems to have avoided the domestic-foreign 










                                                 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IV.   CROSS COUNTRY COMPARISON 
Table 12 juxtaposes the debt restructurings studied in this paper. In the table we present most 
of the relevant characteristics of each exchange, while trying to summarize its implications in 
terms of haircuts and intercreditor equity.  
 
The table shows the size of the exchange, the number of instruments tendered, as well as the 
number of new instruments issued, and the number of options available to investors. It also 
identifies whether the exchange was domestic or international, whether it entailed currency 
conversion, whether payments had been defaulted, etcetera. The table computes the simple 
average of haircuts for each exchange, as well as the weighted average. The weights 
correspond to the share of the instrument in the total of instruments exchanged. Finally it 
shows the standard deviation of haircuts, a measure that is directly related to the amount of 
intercreditor equity, and the maximum and minimum haircut that may be useful reference 
point for other exchanges.  
 
A few main facts emerge from the comparison. First, in terms of the NPV losses sustained, 
the Uruguay exchange was clearly the least coercive (13-15 percent) while the Russian 
international exchange was the most coercive (50 percent). However, if we acknowledge the 
fact that the Argentina exchange restructured the same instruments twice, with more than 
35% haircut on each round, it is those bonds that suffered the largest restructuring. All others 
haircuts fall in the narrow thirty something range.  
 
Particularly striking is the difference in the haircuts suffered by domestic and external 
bondholders in the Russian and the Ukraine exchanges. This pattern however was no longer 
present in the case of Uruguay. In addition, given the size of the restructuring on domestic 
bondholders, it seems unlikely that in the case of Argentina domestic bondholders may fare 
better.  
 
The standard deviation of haircuts within each exchange in most cases is quite low. Thus our 
conclusion is that it is likely that governments may have tried to achieve some sort of inter-
creditor equity. However, the existence of disparities in the haircuts implies that 
implementation fell short of achieving this objective. The most likely explanation for this is 
that governments probably also wanted to offer a few new instruments. This, in turn, reduced 
their ability to reduce inter-creditor inequalities.  
 
Second, the magnitude of the NPV losses appear unrelated to whether there were reductions 
in principal payments, thus, there is no apparent relationship between the “NPV haircut” and 































































Face value of debt exchange (US$ bn) 2.8 0.6 6.3 41 n/a 2.5 1.5
Number of intruments exchanged 33 3 6 50 107 18 45
Number of New Instruments 2 1 2 106 107 18 15
Number of exchange options offered 21 1 - 2 1 - 3 1 2 2
Was there past due principal? yes no yes no no no no
Was there past due interest? yes no yes no no no no
Was cash paid? yes no yes no no yes yes/no
Was there face value reduction? yes no yes no yes no no
Was there currency conversion? no no no no yes no no
Non weighted haircut 34.6 30.3 34.5 35.2/48.8 35.7 13.1 15.3
Weighted haircut 29.8 30.1 28.7 38.2/50.1 n/a 13 14.4
Standard deviation of haircut 12.2 2.7 10.3 10.7/21.8 14.4 4.5 4.7
Maximum haircut 54.4 33.3 47.7 74.0/81.0 88.6 23.2 22.8





























Face value of debt exchange (US$ bn) 1.3 29 0.35
2 0.345
3 0.272
Number of intruments exchanged 21 21 1 2 all T-Bills all T-Bills 2
Number of New Instruments 77 2 2 1 1 2
Number of exchange options offered 11 2 1 1 3 1
Was there past due principal? yes yes yes no no no yes
Was there past due interest? no no no yes no no no
Was cash paid? yes yes no yes no yes/no yes
Was there face value reduction? yes yes no yes no no no
Was there currency conversion? no no yes/no no no yes yes/no
Non weighted haircut 17.7/19.5 17.9/19.6 57.1 49.7 7.4/7.8 52.5 33.1
Weighted haircut 17.1/18.9 17.4/19.1 57.1
4 49.2 7.4/7.8 52.5 33.6
Standard deviation of haircut 2.9/2.8 2.7/2.7 20.3 1.48 nil nil 3.4
Maximum haircut 22.4/24.0 22.4/24.0 57.1 50.8 7.4/7.8 52.5 35.5
Minimum haircut 12.9/14.7 13.2/15.1 28.3 49.7 7.4/7.8 52.5 30.7
1/ Corresponds to 112 bn rubles at the rate at the time of the exchange
2/ Corresponds to 0.8 bn hyrvnias at the rate at the time of the exchange
3/ Corresponds to 1.17 bn hyrvnias at the rate at the time of the exchange
4/ We take into account only one option, the other was ignored by bond holders
4.93
1





In order to study this information in a more systematic fashion, we pooled the instrument 
level data and ran a few simple regressions with exchange-specific fixed effects. The results 
are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13. Regression Results 
 
  Domestic Investors    International Investors 








  NPV Haircut  NPV Haircut 
ARGENTINA  35.278*** 32.037*** 40.460*** 54.753***   0.000 0.000 
  (0.931) (1.519) (1.121) (2.001)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
ECUADOR  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   33.474*** 36.229*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (3.968)  (7.160) 
PAKISTAN  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   30.265*** 30.152*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (5.611)  (4.142) 
RUSSIA  17.733*** 15.260*** 19.490*** 21.100***   43.068***  33.502*** 
  (2.546) (3.507) (3.066) (4.621)   (5.611)  (6.788) 
UKRAINE  7.755 7.483 7.359 7.670   24.646*** 35.645*** 
  (11.667) (7.589)  (14.051) (10.000)   (1.620)  (3.084) 
URUGUAY  15.333*** 13.747*** 15.333*** 16.739***   12.736***  15.212*** 
  (1.739) (1.525) (2.095) (2.009)   (2.291)  (2.792) 
AVERAGELIFE   0.379***   -0.394**     -0.326 
   (0.124)   (0.163)      (0.246) 
AMOUNTOUTSTANDING   0.000   -0.000      0.001* 
   (0.001)   (0.001)      (0.001) 
NH   0.099   -0.066      -0.003 
   (0.139)   (0.183)      (0.167) 
CC   0.000   0.000      6.123* 
   (0.000)   (0.000)      (3.379) 
Observations  224 116 224 116   66  37 
R-squared  0.88 0.93 0.86 0.93   0.87  0.95 
 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
 
The table distinguishes between domestic exchanges and international exchanges. 
Furthermore, for the domestic exchanges, it is run both for the upper and lower bounds for 
the haircut computation. For some countries information is only available in a particular 
category. The first regression for each set uses the country dummies only.  It confirms the 
ranking of average losses suggested in Table 12. Among international exchanges the Russian 
exchange shows the largest haircuts, with Ukraine, Ecuador and Pakistan in the 24-33% 
range. Finally, Uruguay (with 13 percent) shows the smallest haircuts. Among the domestic 
exchanges Argentina singles out, with an average haircut of 35% (with the clarification that 
such haircut was applied twice to the same instruments). In the cases where a comparison is 










The second version of each regression, includes four characteristics of the instruments being 
exchanged: their average life, the amount issued, the nominal haircut and whether it was 
subject to currency conversion. As can be seen from the coefficients there is little evidence 
that certain instruments were hurt in a systematic fashion. No discernible pattern arises for 
domestic exchanges, and weak evidence for international exchanges suggests that larger 
instruments suffer a larger haircut. Similarly, it seems that currency conversion have been 
associated to larger haircuts. However, this last evidence should be read with care, as it relies 
on a few exchanges, all of them in Ukraine.  
 
In summary we find little systematic evidence as to the nature of haircuts except for the fact 






                                                 





V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has two main results: first, average NPV haircuts varied substantially between the 
debt restructurings studied, with the “toughest” exchange being Argentina´s domestic 
exchange with a combined haircut above 70%, followed by the Russian exchange (about 
50%), the “softest” being Uruguay, with a haircut close to 10 percent. Second, large 
variations in haircuts existed within some of the exchanges, depending on the instrument 
tendered. The former is not surprising, since variations in haircuts across debt exchanges 
were to be expected as a result of differences in between countries’ ability to pay, willingness 
to pay, and bargaining power. In contrast, large variations in haircuts within exchanges are 
surprising, as they appear to conflict with the notion of intercreditor equity, and the equal 
legal status of bondholders.  
A potential “explanation” for the variations we find is that much lower discount rates than 
the market rates prevailing after the exchange may have been used in determining the value 
of each original instrument, and hence the compensation that each was offered. In particular, 
the use of a zero discount rate could be rationalized by the legal acceleration of payments, i.e. 
the legal principle, typically embodied in bond contracts, that once default has occurred, the 
original maturity is irrelevant and all principal becomes immediately due and payable. In this 
philosophy, intercreditor equity conditional on default would imply equal treatment not on an 
NPV basis but on a face value basis. Of course, at the rates prevailing after the exchange, this 
generates widely different NPV losses. 
 
At any rate, the other significant regularity found was the fact that domestic exchanges 
implied initially (Russia and Ukraine) lower haircuts. It is not difficult to see why. A debt 
restructuring implies, in addition to the deadweight losses associated to the decision and its 
resolution, a decision on how to transfer resources among three different groups: domestic 
taxpayers, domestic bondholders and foreign bondholders. It is not difficult to see that 
governments may choose to benefit the former two at the expense of the latter.  However, we 
must also acknowledge that in the case of Uruguay there was no distinction between 
bondholders.  
In the recent discussion of new international financial architecture, and also to understand 
why countries choose to default several questions remain unanswered: What are the costs to 
bondholders from a default? What are the reputational costs faced by a country and how do 
they depend on the harshness of the debt restructuring pursued? What are the determinants of 
the game between creditors and governments. For example, do the terms of a restructuring 
depend on the time elapsed since default as a war of attrition model would suggest?  
 
This paper, by estimating in a consistent and comprehensive manner the specific losses for 
each instruments defaulted in the seven countries considered, allows to tackle these research 
questions in a systematic fashion.  
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